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Abstract  
 
For Hannah Arendt, the federal system is an effective mode of organizing different sources 
of power while avoiding sovereign politics. This article aims to contribute two specific claims 
to the burgeoning scholarship on Arendt’s international federalism. First, Arendt’s 
international thoughts call for balancing two demands: the domestic need for human greatness 
and flourishing and the international demand for regulation and cooperation. Second, her 
reflections on council-based federalism offer a nuanced position that views the dual elements 
of equality in politics (intra-state and inter-state equality) as neither contradictory nor 
reconciliatory but rather as ideal types along a continuum. This study shows that, through the 
unique form of federalism emphasizing the need to balance two demands of free politics with 
a clear acknowledgement of its precariousness, Arendt’s thinking adds much-needed 
sensitivity to international discourse.  
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Hannah Arendt (2006: 145) famously argued that whereas freedom—“the raison d’etre of 
politics”—can only be achieved via acting together, the sovereign will is always unitary and 
negates plurality, the precondition of free politics. Further, she stated (2006: 163), “If men 
wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.” The anti-sovereign aspect of 
Arendt’s thought appeals to critical theories of international relations that problematize the 
mainstream scholarship building on the principles of state sovereignty and international 
anarchy.1 Of course, Arendt’s thinking has distinctive features that do not conform so easily 
to those alternative theories. For example, although Karl Marx’s thoughts constitute a crucial 
source of inspiration for critical international theories, Arendt (1998: 116, 228) considers 
Marx’s arguments too deterministic to fit her free politics, as several scholars (Canovan, 1992: 
63-98; Weisman, 2013; cf. Barbour, 2014) point out. We must also note that, though fiercely 
resistant to establishing politics in natural and quasi-natural criteria, Arendt (1998: 50-58) 
emphasizes a politically engaged care for the world in which individuals act and attain their 
public identities. By highlighting a rootedness solidified through public remembrance and 
organized communities, Arendt’s thinking differs from the poststructuralist rendition of 
subjectivity in which individuals have no agency for their identity construction (Hyvönen, 2016: 
201-205; Lang, 2005: 223; Villa, 1992). That said, Arendt would undoubtedly find problematic 
the overly deterministic aspect of mainstream international theories arguing that no central 
authority exists among sovereign states and that this immutable anarchic status of international 
politics brings states into constant security competition (Baehr, 2010: 14-26; Barder and 
McCourt, 2010; Williams, 2005: 6). Indeed, a recent trend in Arendt studies is to engage in this 
 
1 I use “critical theory” as an umbrella term to refer to alternative theories of international relations, 
within which four core stands exist: Frankfurt School critical theory, neo-Gramscian theory, 
feminism, and post-structuralism (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007: 5-10).  
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promising area where her thinking aligns with critiques of the assumptions of mainstream 
international theories. Grounded in Arendt’s critique of sovereignty, violence, and domination, 
several works have fruitfully applied her free politics to the global dimension of politics (e.g. 
Axtmann, 2006; Hayden, 2009; Owens, 2007).  
Less explored, however, is Arendt’s discussion of federalism, a mode of political 
organization that divides powers between two or more institutional levels of government. It 
is not the only way to separate power; confederalism and devolution also divide powers. Yet, 
federalism is distinctive as a middle way, pursuing more or less integration between the general 
and regional levels of government than confederalism and devolution, respectively (Hueglin 
and Fenna, 2005: 31). Arendt (2006: 141) also recognizes that “the separation or the balance 
of powers” is federalism’s function. The federated republic, Arendt (2006: 142) believes, 
eschews the possibility that powers at the local level of politics will be destroyed or “result in 
a decrease of [their] potency” through tyrannies or excessive legalism. At the same time, her 
federalism resists any approach that renders the power of the central government non-existent 
because, without a viable central government, “the allied powers” of the local units “cancel 
one another out” (Arendt, 2006: 144). In Arendt’s (2006: 166, 1970: 44) view, power emerges 
from people acting in concert and the federal system is an effective mode of organization for 
associating different sources of power. In federation, “neither expansion nor conquest but the 
further combination of powers” happens (Arendt, 2006: 159). Arendt (2006: 144) claims that 
federalism avoids the centralization of power and contributes to the abolition of sovereignty.  
If federalism is a central element in Arendt’s thoughts regarding how to associate 
powers while avoiding sovereign politics, delving into her views on federation is necessary to 
any presentation of her free politics at the international level. To date, however, a systematic 
analysis in this regard is wanting. In the pioneering works applying Arendt’s thinking to 
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international politics, her views on federalism only constitute a small segment (Axtmann, 2006: 
107; Hayden, 2009: 26; Owens, 2007: 145). Recent engagement with Arendt’s accounts of 
federation and the role of councils in her thinking is inspiring, but its discussion of 
international federalism is rather sporadic (Ashcroft, 2015: 436; Lederman, 2019: 30; Selinger, 
2016: 418). Certainly, several attempts to relate Arendt’s thoughts to supranational institutions 
such as the European Union exist (Benhabib, 2006: 13-80; Rensmann, 2019; Verovšek, 2014: 
403-410). Yet, as Douglas Klusmeyer (2009: 51) notes, Arendt’s reluctance to spell out a clear 
model of international federation has a special meaning in her political thoughts. Her real 
intent becomes clear when we identify and address the crucial questions her federalism raises: 
What is the unit of federation? Are all units of federation or sites of power equal? Or, does 
Arendt’s federal system operate on two separate tracks: domestic and global federations? How 
are the lower and higher councils in the federal system Arendt envisions connected?  
This article attends to issues regarding federation’s unit and scale that Arendt’s writings 
generate. Using her federalism as a case study to examine her international thought, I show 
that her thinking is dualistic in nature. Arendt approves of neither authoritarianism nor 
imperialism, and her council-based federalism is a refined program that helps us avoid those 
two dangers free politics encounters. In the end, though, Arendt leaves inconclusive her views 
on some specific areas of international politics to which her federalism can be extended. Such 
ambiguity is closely associated with her acute recognition of the difficulty in balancing intra-
state and inter-state equality for free politics.  
Beyond Arendt studies, the paper engages with contemporary scholarship on 
international federalism. Federalism has been a contentious issue in international relations. For 
some, a prime example of federalism that challenges the form of state relations dictated by the 
anarchic Westphalian system is the Philadelphia System of the American States Union of 1787-
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1861 (e.g. Deudney, 1995: 201). The Philadelphian model is applicable to the global scale of 
politics because the technological development of modern weaponry, such as nuclear weapons, 
prompts states to consider the cost of their violent competition. This change in the material 
contexts of violence motivates states to revamp their extant security arrangements, 
alternatively creating a “federal-republican world nuclear government” (Deudney, 2007: 162). 
Sharing the broad insight into federalism as a middle way that avoids both international 
hierarchy and anarchy, other scholars explore its specific value in international law (e.g. Cohen, 
2012: 80-158). The argument is that the legal order federalism envisions eschews abuses of 
power in both global and domestic orders, to which other forms of power separation at the 
international level, such as global constitutionalism and legal pluralism, are vulnerable, 
respectively.2  
The burgeoning scholarship on international federalism can greatly benefit from 
Arendt’s insights. As this paper will detail, Arendt’s thinking, by associating federalism with 
her action-driven free politics, urges security theorists to revisit their material base for 
federation and, with her radical critique of sovereignty, directs international law scholars’ 
attention to the danger of entertaining the idea of sovereign and reified states in federation.  
 
The federal system: Neither from above nor from below  
As noted, Arendt thinks the federated republic abolishes sovereignty. Broadly, sovereignty 
refers to the supreme authority of a governing body over itself. In state politics, sovereignty 
entails two claims: the state is the supreme authority within its territory over its inhabitants, 
 
2 Contra legal pluralism, global constitutionalism argues that “[states’] legal systems have their 
conditions of validity … in the higher, supreme, autonomous international legal order” (Cohen, 2012: 
48). The intricate question of international legal order’s source aside, however, constructing a less 
rigid form of global constitutionalism is not impossible (Lang, 2013: 114-115).  
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and it is autonomous from outside powers. To Arendt, the discourse of sovereignty, which 
assumes the presence and necessity of a commander with ultimate discretion of power, takes 
the form of rule and domination. It is thus anti-political, contradicting her idea of free politics, 
which occurs through talks and mutual deliberation among diverse equals. Arendt (2006: 143) 
understands that the federated system associates multiple sites of power and eschews power’s 
concentration in a single sovereign source.  
But, what concerns us here is whether and how such a federalist vision of Arendt’s 
free politics applies to international politics. Fundamental to Arendt’s international thinking is 
that she approves of neither the sovereign state system nor the world state. On one hand, 
Arendt is greatly troubled by state sovereignty and its effect on warfare. Knowing the 
decolonization struggles of the 1960s, Arendt (1970: 5) expresses her anxiety about the 
development that “national independence, namely, freedom from foreign rule, and the 
sovereignty of the state, namely, the claim to unchecked and unlimited power in foreign affairs, 
are identified.” On the other hand, Arendt worries that institutionalizing the vision of 
cosmopolitan oneness could lead to world tyranny. To Arendt (1972: 230), “[the] world 
government … could easily become the most frightful tyranny conceivable, since from its 
global police force there would be no escape—until it finally fell apart.” It is interesting that 
when opposing a world government, Arendt does not invoke individuals or communities. 
Arendt’s (1968: 81) statement that the world state is a sovereign entity that is “unchecked and 
uncontrolled by other sovereign powers” indicates that in resisting the rise of world state, she 
sees a functional value of the pluralistic orders states constitute.  
Does Arendt believe federalism should extend to international politics? As Arendt’s 
(1968: 93) account of “a world-wide federated structure” attests, her answer is affirmative. 
This wording, however, appears in a short essay and only raises further questions, such as what 
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the basic unit of world federation is. Several works in intellectual history highlight Arendt’s 
early writings on postwar European reconstruction and Israel–Palestine relations to provide 
more substance on this topic. William Selinger (2016: 421-431), for instance, observes that 
Arendt’s writings in the 1940s, though supportive of a European federation, suggest that its 
base lie in nationalities, not individuals. Driving this federalism is Arendt’s (2007: 130) belief 
that within a federal structure of European nations with its own parliament, Jews can be 
recognized and represented as a nation. Grounded in the nation-based federation, Arendt also 
considers the Jewish–Arab question in Palestine. Rather than advocating for a national Jewish 
state in Palestine, Arendt (2007: 197) envisions integrating the region into a much larger 
federation, such that a federation in Palestine is part of higher federations in the Middle East, 
the Mediterranean region, and even Europe. Arendt (2007: 196) expects that once both Jews 
and Arabs enjoy equal rights as members of a larger system, deciding a ruler over Palestine 
will become unnecessary.  
Of course, presenting an Arendtian federalism that is congenial to nationalities needs 
qualification. For one, the nation operative in Arendt’s federalism is not territorial (Selinger, 
2016: 424). To Arendt (1994: 210), “[w]ithin federated structures, nationality would become a 
personal status rather than a territorial one.” In addition, the nation Arendt has in mind relies 
on a shared past or “organized remembrance” primarily conceived of as “the beginning of 
identity for individuals within that tradition and, from this, the loose, changing basis of 
national identity” (Ashcroft, 2017: 444). Thus, the principle of plurality that denies a definite 
center of power should be effective at both the national and the individual levels of politics. 
Finally, Arendt’s federalism concerns not merely the external federation of states or nations 
but also their internal federalization (Lederman, 2019: 13). This is evident when Arendt (1994: 
114, also 2007: 400) applauds the French resistance movements which recognize that “a 
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federative structure of Europe must be based on similarly federated structures in the 
constituent states.” For Arendt (1972: 231-233), a good candidate for the small units of such 
internal federalization is federated grassroots councils.  
These interpretations about Arendt’s early writings bring needed clarity to the “some 
kind of organized community” Arendt (1973: 294) considers for free politics. However, they 
still face the core issue that arises when one makes a case for Arendt’s international federalism. 
Territorial or not, an Arendtian political community encounters the question of whether and 
how it can pursue action and freedom in intra-polity and inter-polity relations to the same 
degree simultaneously (Lee, 2020: 5-10). True, the principle of plurality must apply to all levels 
of Arendt’s free politics (Ashcroft, 2017: 448). But, for Arendt, plurality exists as a condition 
for action. Our questions, then, need to be more specific: Who is the constitutive actor in 
Arendt’s international federalism? Two types of actor, collective and individual, are 
conceivable in this context. Arendt’s council model mitigates their possible conflict by seeking 
internal federalization. Yet, as detailed below, it cannot avoid the challenge representation 
creates.  
To further articulate a form of political community Arendt’s federalism implies, the 
remainder of this section discusses state agency, or the scope of states’ ability to engage with 
each other. This analysis is a preliminary step for the later examination of Arendt’s intended 
ambiguity in some of the areas of international federalism.  
Saying that Arendt entrusts the state with a degree of agency may be absurd. But, 
Arendt’s (1973: 275) appreciation of the constitutional state, along with her qualified 
endorsement of nationality for federalism noted above, suggests that state agency is not 
irrelevant to Arendt. In fact, the question of state agency comes to the fore when Arendt 
formulates a new concept of the state. In her interview conducted in 1970 and published later 
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as “Thoughts on Politics and Revolution,” Arendt argues that the rudiments of that innovative 
idea are found in the federal system. Drawing attention to what she describes in On Revolution 
as the federation model’s advantage over the sovereign nation, Arendt (1972: 230) claims that 
federalism allows for a situation in which “power moves neither from above nor from below, 
but is horizontally directed so that the federated units mutually check and control their powers.” 
To Arendt, then, federalism facilitates two features of free politics. First, the federal system 
resists the power imposed from above on the people. In the international context, power 
“from above” points to world government. Thus, in her specific reference to federalism during 
the interview, Arendt confirms that the new order of the world ought to be international rather 
than supernational. That is, we need not install a single hegemonic power to enforce a new 
order for the whole world but instead cultivate a space for mutual deliberation among states. 
Federalism, for Arendt, is an effective method for working toward such a goal. However, 
Arendt also argues that the federal system avoids power moving “from below.” By this, Arendt 
is not denying the importance of local agency in politics. The situation Arendt considers here 
is that the source of power solely lies in each sovereign state—leading to constant interstate 
competition for security.  
In Arendt’s view, federalism is essential for envisaging a new order of world politics 
because it shifts attention to the international dimension in between states from both “power 
from the above” and “power from the below.” Arendt’s genuine appreciation of this merit of 
federalism is implied when she asks, “Where do we find models that could help us in 
construing, at least theoretically, an international authority as the highest control agency?” 
(1972: 231). Objecting to both world tyranny and international anarchy, Arendt highlights the 
importance of securing a space where states can continue sharing diverse opinions regarding 
world affairs. For this, she finds it crucial that we first revisit our assumption that what is 
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highest always has to be sovereign. To Arendt, the highest authority in world politics should 
be found in between states, and federalism is best able to actualize this idea.   
However, to what extent the state has agency in international affairs is unclear. If the 
highest authority in world politics is conceived of as being between states and derivative of 
their agreements, this in effect assumes that the actor in question is a state. But, if a state is 
free to make decisions as a constitutive actor of international politics, does this not affect the 
agency of the people it represents? In fact, how to attend to the “structural” dimension of the 
state while keeping individual citizens’ agency intact is highly contested in the contemporary 
scholarship of international relations (Jackson, 2004: 285; Miller, 2016: 223-226; Wight, 2004), 
and Arendt’s statement about federalism’s relationship to state agency is rather ambiguous. In 
response to this charge, one may contend that overall, Arendt’s thinking strongly suggests she 
fundamentally disagrees with any type of statism and that Arendt would even assure us that 
the real actors in international terrain ought to be individual persons, not states. If we follow 
this line of interpretation, it does appear that the best form of democratic engagement 
matching Arendt’s vision of free politics in world politics is something like “global social 
movements” (Kaldor, 2013; Smith, 2007).  
Certainly, many of Arendt’s works indicate her great problems with sovereign statism. 
Indeed, the Rousseauian state uniting citizens in a single General Will is a nightmare to 
Arendt’s vision of free politics (Canovan, 1983; Volk, 2015: 67-92). Yet, Arendt (1968: 81-82, 
1973: 267-302, 2006: 267) still considers the state an extremely important facilitator of freedom 
and action, not only because the state is the second-best option for avoiding statelessness—
the most extreme form of vulnerability—but also because it provides stability for politics and 
eventually fosters public culture and civilization. Arendt (2006: 148) articulates this point well 
in On Revolution, arguing that a constitution is “an endurable objective thing,” rather than the 
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product of a constitutive will. Separated from the ever-changing will or moods of a multitude, 
the constitutional state secures stability and goes through gradual modifications in accordance 
with changing circumstances (2006: 216). Only through such “a lasting institution” does 
Arendt (1998: 197, 2006: 221) think human beings can achieve the greatness of public culture 
and civilization, as they eschew the difficulty of “establish[ing] together the everlasting 
remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future 
ages.” Arendt’s broad point here is that, owing to such an internal demand for stability and 
continuity for human greatness, the constitutional state has an independent dimension once it 
is created and put in (federal) relationship with other states (Canovan, 1996: 18; Villa, 2008: 
250; Waldron, 2000).  
Back to the question of how to construct “an international authority,” we find an 
unresolved issue regarding state agency. Arendt urges us to explore the international “in-
between,” where plural states—rather than one hegemonic supranational entity—continue 
sharing their different views and achieve a (fragile) consensus. This sensible suggestion, 
however, leads us to question the merits and challenges associated with treating the state as a 
“living” actor in reaching international agreements. The concern about such an emphasis on 
“state personhood” (Wendt, 2004: 293-295) is that it increases the possibility that the state as 
an actor in the international domain will pursue its collective interest, which may not always 
be compatible with the interests of individual citizens or sub-communities of the state.  
 
The council system for federations 
Arendt’s discussion of the council system right after international authority in the interview in 
question suggests that she considers it an essential component for restructuring international 
politics. We have confirmed that Arendt had a deep interest in the council system early on. As 
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recent careful studies demonstrate, her federalist thinking is inseparable from the rich tradition 
of the council system (Lederman, 2019: 171-197; Muldoon, 2016). The radical call for internal 
federalization, which Arendt notes was vivid among some of the grassroots movements 
influenced by that tradition, is particularly relevant to an investigation of Arendt’s international 
federalism. But, for the actual implementation of this desire in international politics, the 
specific status of councils in federation needs to be clear. Are all units of federation or all layers 
of councils equal? Does a local council stand alone or play a supplementary role for higher 
institutions?  
The council system, according to Arendt, is based on some of the experiences of 
modern revolution. Although her account of the council model in the 1970 interview is brief, 
she provides a fuller explanation in other places. For instance, in the article titled “Totalitarian 
Imperialism,” Arendt (1958: 32) recounts how, in the Hungarian Revolution, the councils—
the lower councils in the provinces, the higher councils, and the Supreme Council—quickly 
and effectively formed a complex system of coordination at multiple levels of politics. The 
accuracy of Arendt’s descriptions of councils aside (Muldoon, 2016: 785), the Hungarian 
Revolution evidently reinforced her belief in council-based federation, and Arendt (2006: 270) 
later incorporates this observation into her major work, On Revolution:  
 
[T]he men who sat in the councils were also an elite, they were even the only 
political elite, of the people and sprung from the people, the modern world 
has ever seen, but they were not nominated from above and not supported 
from below. … From these “elementary republics,” the councilmen then 
chose their deputies for the next higher council, and these deputies, again, were 
selected by their peers, they were not subject to any pressure either from above 
or from below. Their title rested on nothing but the confidence of their 
equals… Once elected and sent in the next higher council, the deputy found 
himself again among his peers, for the deputies on any given level in this 
system were those who had received a special trust. 
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Similar to her claim that federalism avoids power from both above and below, Arendt here 
argues that the council system depends on neither an order from above nor a demand from 
below. Arendt wants to show how the council system eschews the command–obedience or 
top-down model of politics. She acknowledges that the delegation process in the council 
system renders it pyramidal. But, for Arendt, the council system is not authoritarian because 
public deliberation among equals, as well as their mutual confidence, is decisive in it. Hence, 
Arendt (2006: 270) asserts that “while, in all authoritarian government we know of, authority 
is filtered down from above, in this case authority [is] generated neither at the top nor at the 
bottom, but on each of the pyramid’s layers.” 
This voluntary system of coordination at multiple levels of council politics must have 
affected Arendt’s judgment that the council system helps us form a new concept of the state. 
In Arendt’s (1972: 233) words, “[a] council-state of this sort, to which the principle of 
sovereignty would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited to federations of the most 
various kinds, especially because in it power would be constituted horizontally and not 
vertically.” However, as was her account of federalism, this statement is incomplete. It only 
claims that a state’s being reconstructed to accommodate the multiple sites of power the 
council model fosters greatly facilitates federation. Federation can happen in either of two 
directions. In one, different political communities are federated within the boundaries of the 
same state. In the other, a worldwide federation is composed of different states, each of which 
has an independent legal and political order. Arendt’s accounts do not specify if and how the 
new state reconstructed via the council system facilitates these two (not necessarily 
complementary) demands of federation to the same degree simultaneously.3 
 
3 As Lederman (2019: 18) points out, Arendt’s interest in both international and domestic federations 
is a distinctive aspect of her thinking. Yet, her accounts of the council state do not specify how such 
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Facing Arendt’s ambivalence, one may argue that her council-based federalism has no 
real implications for international politics because “from the external standpoint there is not 
the difference that [Arendt] sometimes imagined between federal republics and nation-states” 
(Arato and Cohen, 2010: 162). This interpretation renders Arendt’s thoughts closer to the 
Waltzian theory of international politics that treats states as identical; how the state is internally 
constituted does not really matter (Waltz, 1979). Arendt’s theory of political association is far 
from this. On Revolution, among others, demonstrates how her constitutionalism integrates new 
voices for change into constitutional amendments as a way of augmentation through which 
people actively apply and expand constitutional principles in their public lives and 
incrementally modify the existing arrangements of public judgement (Arendt, 2006: 192-206, 
219-221). If the constitutional state’s internal arrangement changes, the existing stipulations 
regarding the state’s external relations with other states will not remain intact. Thus, the 
implications of Arendt’s theory go well beyond the domestic affairs of political community.  
Another way of dealing with Arendt’s ambiguity is to argue that she treats all units of 
federation (such as individuals, groups, and states) as equal narratives that are constantly 
connected and reconnected through storytelling across the sites of their origins (Benhabib, 
2007: 454-456, 2009: 697-699). This interpretation is plausible, if not free from interpretive 
problems. The relational dimension of storytelling comes to the fore when Arendt articulates 
her theory of action. For her, action and speech produce stories when inserted into a web of 
human relationships. Arendt (1998: 50, 184, 190) famously describes such a mutually 
constituted aspect of action-driven politics by stating that we become both “actors” and 
“sufferers” through storytelling. This rendition of Arendt’s thinking seems quite compatible 
 
a concomitant federation occurs. This is particularly so, as detailed below, when we examine her 
council-state with regard to the two demands of equality for free politics.  
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with narrative theories of international relations that accentuate the intersubjective dimension 
of state actors (Neumann, 2004; Ringmar, 1996; Weber, 1998).  
However, two aspects of the council system in Arendt’s thinking challenge the 
narrativist interpretation. First, Arendt’s statements about the council system suggest that the 
council goes through a delegation process. Since this creates different levels in the system, 
Arendt’s council-based federalism does not easily fit with any position that treats all units of 
federation as nominal. In addition, for Arendt, a delegation in the council system has an ending 
point. Her accounts suggest that people at the grassroots level volunteer to create a council 
and that peers in such an elementary council select their deputies for the next higher council. 
Does this delegation work in such a back-and-forth way across the different levels of the 
council system? Arendt would say no. According to her, the council system forms a pyramid, 
even though it differs from the typical authoritarian government. A pyramidal government 
based on the council system implies that a highest level of delegation exists. Arendt’s council-
based politics, then, has a certain end point; that is, it is not characterized by an endless back-
and-forth exchange of individual narratives.  
As such, Arendt’s ambiguity persists. This becomes even clearer when we ask what the 
end point in the council system is. Does the delegation process end at the state level? Or, do 
the deputies at the level of the constitutional state select another group for the next council at 
the global level? If we assume that the council model extends to the global level, where all 
representatives of different states come together, the burden of representation becomes heavy. 
The deputies sent to the global council have to represent the already diverse opinions of their 
states. In a sense, this issue should not trouble Arendt’s council-based politics because she is 
clear that the council system’s authority comes from neither above nor below. Yet, the 
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problem of how to represent internal diversity will truly disappear only if the higher level of 
politics is completely disconnected from the views from below.  
This detachment from the base of politics is not Arendt’s preference. When she deals 
with the council system, Arendt does not want to abandon the “bottom-up” approach 
fostering public deliberation at the grassroots level that crystalizes her republicanism.4 By her 
remark of “not from below,” Arendt (2006: 270) means that independence exists in “each of 
the pyramid’s layers [of the council system].” From this multi-layered source of power, we can 
see that Arendt’s council-based politics significantly reduces the problem of representation 
when compared to the central sovereign politics model. However, this problem does not 
disappear to the extent that the deputies at the global council are released from the obligation 
to reflect the opinions of the people they represent, nor will opinions and narratives at the 
local level of the council system always be smoothly and harmoniously exchanged with those 
at the global level of the system.  
Against this interpretation accentuating Arendt’s ambiguity, one may contend that for 
Arendt, the council system is based on mutual trust and that trust among individuals of the 
council system serves to fill the gaps between the system’s different layers. Arendt (1958: 30, 
2006: 270) does describe deputies as receiving “a special trust” from the peers who selected 
them. But, much caution is required in handling this term for our context. A special trust from 
his people does not mean that the deputy is free to do whatever he wants at the next council. 
He is still responsible to represent the people who have selected him. In addition, we must 
consider the complexity associated with the increasingly expansive burden of representation 
as the delegation process goes up to higher levels. Is the range of representation at the city 
 
4 For further articulation of Arendt’s “bottom-up” approach and her insight into local agency, see 
Lee (forthcoming).  
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council the same as that at the province or state council? The latter must be more expansive 
than the former with regard to the range of diversity it can accommodate.  
When Arendt emphasizes the autonomy of each layer of the council system, her target 
of critique is the top-down model of politics. Yet, although her resistance to the command–
obedience view of politics via council-based federalism is clear and insightful, we are left with 
the question of how the deputies at different levels of the council system are connected. 
Arendt (2006: 270) herself only confirms that the deputies “rested on nothing but the 
confidence of their equals.” Equals here can indicate equality between the deputy and either 
the people who select him or other deputies who meet him at the higher council. Arendt’s 
point may be that confidence exists in both cases. However, she does not clarify “the 
relationship between the delegates of the lower and those of the higher councils” (Kalyvas, 
2008: 280). All we have here are two cases that are not necessarily the same: the people’s 
confidence in their deputy that he is “best suited to present [their] view before the next higher 
council” (Arendt, 1972: 233) and other deputies’ confidence in the deputy in question as a 
conversational working partner.  
As their actual objects of confidence are not identical, we should not mingle these two 
cases. Doing so not only obscures the very possibility of conflict between these different 
sources of confidence but also fails to capture the real meaning of Arendt’s ambiguity in her 
formulation of a new state via the council system. Indeed, such conflict is most probable in 
the context of international politics, as the deputy in question would be torn between the trust 
that comes from the people who selected him as their state representative and the confidence 
that other deputies at the global council meeting who are responsible for representing their 
own people’s views place in him as a competent diplomatic partner. 
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Thus, Arendt’s council-based federalism leaves inconclusive some of the points 
pertinent to international politics. Arendt surely considers council-based federalism effective 
for achieving her free politics. This belief is undergirded by her judgments that for freedom to 
exist as “a tangible reality,” a spatial limit should exist and that the bounded public space is 
not singular; there can be many public spaces for freedom (2006: 267, 232). Still, for Arendt 
(2006: 270), these public spaces are not scattered but can form a pyramidal structure through 
the delegation process. Such a council-based politics, while providing autonomy at each level 
of delegation, significantly departs from the sovereign state model that subjects all power 
sources to a central sovereign entity. However, Arendt’s council model does not specify the 
relationship between the higher and lower levels of councils. This ambiguity, as I have 
suggested, closely relates to Arendt’s recognition of a difficult issue her council-based 
federalism raises for international politics: How much autonomy does the delegate of the state 
have as a diplomatic actor in the international scene as he balances representing his people 
with being a working partner of the delegates from other states?  
  
Cosmopolitan and communitarian variants of federalism  
Behind Arendt’s lack of clarity in her statements about the federal/council system lies a broad 
issue of state agency. In general, two areas of concern exist with regard to maintaining state 
agency: inter-state equality and intra-state equality. Arendt’s council-based federalism suggests 
her awareness that together, these two demands complicate international federalism.  
As noted earlier, Arendt sees that creating an international authority in between states 
would have the positive effect of resisting the rise of global hegemony or world tyranny. Yet, 
for all states to be treated as equal and international authority to be based on their agreement, 
the main actor in question must be the state. Here, the problem of representation appears 
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because individuals and groups may not always find their interests compatible with the state’s 
collective interest. From Arendt’s perspective, however, the opposite argument is not palatable 
either. Although the idea of equal individuals all around the world achieving a true democracy 
is appealing, politics needs structures and institutions that provide stability and continuity for 
human greatness and flourishing; thus, states should secure some independent dimension once 
they are created. Besides, if states have no agency in the international domain, there will be no 
collective entity responsible for an event like war (Lang, 2002). This would make diplomacy 
ineffective and render international negotiation difficult. Arendt’s council-based federalism, as 
we have seen, is a case in point revealing the complexity in her thoughts on these two aspects 
of state agency.  
The two cases of equality (about the inter-state and intra-state dimensions of state 
politics) relate to contemporary international discourse driven by responses to imperialism and 
authoritarianism. If imperialism is the worst kind of inter-state inequality, authoritarianism is 
the worst type of intra-state inequality. And, one can say that cosmopolitanism argues for anti-
authoritarianism and that a communitarian version of political discourse in international 
politics promotes anti-imperialism. Distinctive in Arendt’s federalism is that while it clearly 
pursues a middle way in international discourse, it also resists any attempts to fully resolve the 
tension between the two competing demands for intra-state and inter-state equality. Cognizant 
of the complex nature of the issue and the highly contingent character of practical politics, 
Arendt never offers a clear-cut solution to this murky area of international discourse. This 
approach can frustrate theorists pursuing a clear model of politics, but the ambivalent aspect 
of Arendt’s council-based federalism helps it reflect the complexity and dynamism of the real 
world of politics.  
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The distinctive aspect of Arendt’s federalism becomes clearer when her thinking is 
compared with other theories of federation. For example, Seyla Benhabib’s and Jean Cohen’s 
recent works on federalism suggest their respective departures from Arendt’s own federalism. 
Their works acutely demonstrate the dangers the construction of a middle ground for 
international politics encounters and the importance of acknowledging the challenge of 
balancing the demands for intra-state and inter-state equality.  
Benhabib (2004a: 115) attributes the ambiguity found in Arendt’s international 
arguments to the conflict between her republican approach and her inchoate Kantianism. As 
an alternative, Benhabib notes that cosmopolitan norms can be reconciled with republican 
principles of self-determination. Thus, her “cosmopolitan federalism” presents itself as 
bridging the familiar gap between the universal and the particular or the global and the local 
(2004b: 171-221). The problem is that this promise of reconciliation tends to privilege 
cosmopolitan norms, as Benhabib conflates the moral and the political.  
Benhabib (2009: 692) emphasizes that her position differs from that of the global 
constitutionalists who, in her view, fail to see the importance of “local contextualization, 
interpretation, and vernacularization [of cosmopolitan norms] by self-governing peoples.” Her 
interest in localness is in line with her view that critical theory should be “a critical theory of 
the present” (2014: 710). Still, her call for critical realism comes with a theory construction 
that is not entirely uncontroversial because she treats the general (moral) association as the 
local where it should be a particular political community. There is not necessarily continuity 
between them, however. As Hans Lindahl (2009: 420) observes, the difference is that “[m]oral 
norms speak to reciprocity between individuals as human beings, regardless of their political 
affiliation; by contrast, legally binding and enforceable norms ultimately presuppose political 
reciprocity.” Of the two discrete kinds of association, what concerns us as the local is not really 
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about an association in general but what is expressed as “ours” or “yours.” Hence, it is not 
very helpful to construct a general association of moral (or morally tamed) individuals and use 
it as a reference point for the rather ambitious project of reconciling cosmopolitan norms and 
local criteria of judgment.  
Like Arendt, Benhabib shows her strong interest in federations at multiple levels of 
politics, but human rights norms clearly drive the type of federations Benhabib has in mind. 
In her view, the new international order, characterized as a human rights regime, is not “a 
smooth ‘command structure’” because individuals interpret the “jurisgenerative” meanings of 
human rights standards in their actual lives (2009: 696). This discursive process can empower 
citizens in democracies. On this basis, Benhabib charges critics of human rights (e.g. 
“democratic sovereigntists”) with ignoring the complex process through which cosmopolitan 
norms interact with the will formation of democratic peoples. As Benhabib perceives it, this 
ought to be a strenuous process. But, if norms are cosmopolitan and supposed to apply 
anytime and everywhere, what is the real implication for human rights practice? Obviously, 
the citizens to be empowered by human rights norms already belong to particular states with 
their own laws and cultures. If advocacy groups such as global human rights NGOs encounter 
local norms and practices that are not easily compatible with human rights, then how will their 
conviction that human rights must be “cosmopolitan” norms help them engage in a strenuous 
dialogue regarding those sources of local differences? Regardless of her intent, Benhabib’s 
cosmopolitan federalism possesses a danger that could be open to the charge of imperialism.  
Compared to Benhabib, Cohen is more cautious about the utility of human rights in 
the international context. In her view, conditioning membership and equality in a society of 
sovereign states according to the Rawlsian kind of “decency” approves the discourse of 
“outlaw states” (2008: 586). Cohen thinks this approach increases the possibility of violating 
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a requirement of international law: the equality of all states. Invoking a series of recent 
“humanitarian” wars conducted by major Western states, Cohen (2008: 586) asks, “Wouldn’t 
suspension of the sovereignty argument when rights to individual dissent, free expression, 
appeal, and the requirement of public justification of policy are violated amount to a green 
light to intervene against any authoritarian regime militarily?” For Benhabib (2009: 698[n30]), 
who is more concerned about the moral import of human rights discourse than its political 
function, Cohen’s approach “put[s] the cart before the horse.” But, for Cohen, the political 
consequences of human rights are an inseparable part of constructing an adequate conception 
of human rights. Reflecting this concern, she raises the threshold of the suspension of 
sovereignty by limiting it to cases of mass extermination and expulsion. This shift of focus 
from a positive list of individual rights to the radical violation of membership helps to reduce 
the problem that comes from favoring a particular type of political community on the basis of 
decency (Cohen, 2008: 588).  
Cohen’s “functional” conception of human rights as the equality of sovereign states 
also appears in her communitarian version of federalism, “constitutional pluralism” (2012: 66-
76). In agreement with legal pluralism, Cohen’s constitutional pluralism affirms and promotes 
the idea that different constitutional orders exist in world politics. But, Cohen (2012: 70) also 
adds that pluralism can take the form of “a complex of political communities within an 
overarching political association of communities each of which has its own legal order of 
constitutional quality.” Contra conventional realism, Cohen (2012: 73) argues that the absence 
of central authority in international politics does not necessarily lead to a vicious cycle of 
conflict and competition. Instead, it can “lead to reflexivity, communication, and cooperation 
and it need not end in fragmentation of either legal system, given sufficient commitment to a 
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common enterprise, i.e. to the overarching political community created by member states and 
peoples.”  
Cohen (2008: 593) treats her sceptics as Schmittian realists who fail to see that 
“sovereignty is a normative and legal category, not only a fact of power.” Her point is that 
although states may violate the principle of sovereign equality, they also constitute a legal 
mechanism that can regulate their conflict and cooperation. This verdict on state sovereignty 
may be empirically contested, but what concerns us here is the internal effect of this approach, 
that is, the intra-state demand of state agency. Cohen (2012: 135) identifies the situation in 
which citizens’ individual agency is significantly reduced as a Schmittian one where “the 
decision over friend and enemy, internal and external, [is made] by a unitary people willing its 
political existence, its way of life, and deciding to maintain its homogeneity in the political 
sphere.” Cohen wants to ensure that constitutional pluralism abandons Schmitt’s existential 
conception of sovereignty.  
But, even when we discard this worst-case scenario, there is no reason to believe that 
the problem associated with security competition would completely disappear in constitutional 
pluralism—a communitarian variant of federalism—because the latter in effect acknowledges 
the presence of different (often irreconcilable) orders in international politics. Cohen does not 
deny the possibility of international conflict rooted in such differences. Her argument is that 
sovereignty can remain the legal principle of sovereign equality among states. Yet, for Cohen 
(2012: 73), this comes with the qualification that there be “sufficient commitment to a 
common enterprise, i.e. to the overarching political community created by member states and 
peoples.” The precondition of sufficient commitment to a common enterprise implies that 
without it, sovereignty would not remain a legal principle but could develop into “a fact of 
power.” If this occurs, then we are essentially back in the familiar situation of state security 
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competition, which in turn increases the danger of the illiberal condition in which individual 
citizens are deprived of their political agency under the so-called “security state.”  
Benhabib’s and Cohen’s approaches only confirm the difficulty of finding a middle 
way in international discourse. Both authors’ common interest in federalism manifests in their 
desires to establish a middle ground for international politics. Yet, their other concerns, such 
as universal human rights or sovereign states, tend to prevail over the complex and dynamic 
aspects of state agency, which Arendt might have wanted to preserve. Thus, Benhabib’s 
cosmopolitan federalism draws closer to deserving the charge of imperialism as it becomes 
more lenient toward the misuse of human rights discourse. Cohen’s communitarian version 
of federalism, though it attends to the political function of human rights, at times entertains a 
rather unrealistic idea of sovereignty. Indeed, sovereignty is often more than a legal principle 
of sovereign equality. Cohen’s constitutional pluralism, although it rightly promotes 
international equality and tolerance, tends to underrate the risk associated with having a 
sovereign nation or state—a danger that frequently manifests in the form of nationalism or 
authoritarianism. Arendt herself thinks we can prevent such a danger only with the presence 
of agonistic citizens devoted to public matters and through the delegation process at multiple 
levels of politics, conditions far from sovereign statism.  
 
The promise of international federalism  
The two variants of federalism are not separable from the contemporary context of politics in 
which the gap between the intra-state and inter-state demands of equality has increasingly 
grown. As Chris Brown (2013: 211-214) sensibly points out, the world has been polarized into 
two forms of international discourse that emphasize either anti-authoritarianism or anti-
imperialism. Cosmopolitanism received particular attention in the decade following the end of 
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Cold War. Human rights activism became conjoined with anti-authoritarianism and took the 
form of humanitarian intervention in “immature” or “failed” countries in the 1990s. However, 
the United States’ function as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era soon led to a 
growing concern about American hegemony. The voices against American power grew 
especially loud in the debate over the Iraq War, which attested to the emergence of anti-
imperialism as a major aspect of contemporary international discourse. With the growing gap 
between anti-authoritarianism and anti-imperialism, it has become common to see those who 
accentuate anti-imperialism be somewhat lenient toward authoritarian regimes, while 
advocates of anti-authoritarianism end up tacitly supporting the use of American/Western 
power for their cause.  
Arendt’s thoughts are particularly relevant in this context. In her thinking, we find 
insight directing our attention to the dual effect the post-Cold War development has had on 
international discourse. This development not only motivates the proponents of anti-
authoritarianism and anti-imperialism to exaggerate the difference between these claims 
against inequality but also provides us with the opportunity to see the fundamental complexity 
that lies in pursuing a middle-ground discourse in international politics. 
Arendt’s thinking identifies two demands of equality (which are essential for 
maintaining state agency) and calls for their balance. This major aspect of her thoughts is 
particularly evident in her reflections on council-based federalism, demonstrating her equal 
disagreement with world government and international anarchy. Arendt finds a fundamental 
problem with the sovereign state system and looks for an alternative model. Contra liberal 
scholars, however, she advocates for international pluralism and considers federalism the best 
way to foster it. Yet, Arendt balances her argument for anti-imperialism with her deep concern 
about the rise of a sovereign dictator enforcing arbitrary decisions. Her emphasis on 
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participatory politics at the grassroots level evinces her awareness of the danger of 
authoritarianism and her firm belief that we can protect ourselves from tyranny only when we 
actively deliberate public issues as diverse equals. In these regards, both intra-state and inter-
state equality receive due respect in Arendt’s thoughts. 
But, although Arendt does not view pursuing both anti-authoritarianism and anti-
imperialism as contradictory, as some of the realist and communitarian thinkers argue, she 
hardly thinks the goals of intra-state and inter-state equality are fully reconcilable in politics. 
To be sure, as noted, Arendt’s call for federalism emerges from an endeavor to balance intra-
state equality (against authoritarianism) and inter-state equality (against imperialism). One clear 
result of this line of thinking is her suggestion of “a world-wide federated structure,” which 
she further details when delving into the council model, especially how the councils form a 
complex system of coordination at multiple layers of politics and function as “spaces of 
freedom” to incorporate new voices for change into the existing arrangements of 
political/legal judgment (1968: 93, 2006: 256). This integrative feature of Arendtian political 
community renders it far from self-contained. Indeed, as a case for international politics, 
Arendt’s council-based federalism strongly suggests that severe competition for security 
among states is not an inevitable outcome. Arendt’s federalism envisions and considers the 
condition under which states coexist while holding their own orders, each of which goes 
through gradual modifications as disruptive voices and opinions calling for change are 
integrated into the resulting amendments of the constitution.  
Even so—and this is crucial—Arendt’s federalism remains inconclusive regarding 
state agency. Her objection to a world state comes with her wholehearted endorsement of 
international plurality, the condition that fosters the pluralistic orders in international politics. 
For Arendt, this condition is necessary for creating an international authority in between states, 
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which in turn would prevent any rise of global hegemony. Here, though, we face this question: 
Who is the constitutive actor in that pluralist order of international politics? If the main 
representatives on the diplomatic scene are states, the ensuing issue is that of representation, 
often dubbed the “part and whole” problem. We can hardly predict that individuals and groups 
will always find their interests compatible with states’ collective interests. However, treating 
individuals as the main representative actors in the international scene does not entirely express 
Arendt’s thinking either. For an effective diplomacy, Arendt would agree that collective 
entities such as states are essential—in fact, in her statements about resisting world tyranny, 
states constituting pluralistic orders for international politics receive core attention. She also 
asserts that states need to secure certain independent dimensions for themselves to help free 
politics avoid constant popular turbulence and foster stability and continuity for achieving 
human greatness and flourishing.  
Arendt’s international federalism oscillates between these two aspects of state agency. 
On one hand, through the council model, Arendt’s federalism reduces the gap between the 
claims of inter-state equality against imperialism and intra-state equality against 
authoritarianism. On the other, Arendt’s thinking suggests that at the most fundamental level, 
these demands are not fully reconcilable. A clear symptom of this dual aspect of Arendt’s 
thinking is her ambiguity regarding the relationship between the higher and lower levels of 
councils. We thus confirm that the state in Arendt’s council-based federalism is torn between 
the demands of representing its people and being a competent diplomatic partner to other 
state actors. 
Should we consider this ambiguity a weakness in Arendt’s thoughts? We have 
discussed how some contemporary Arendt studies and cosmopolitan and communitarian 
variants of federalism fail to see the real meaning behind such ambiguity in Arendt’s 
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international federalism. For a federalist stream of international security theory, too, pursuing 
an Arendtian federation cannot be viewed favorably. For example, in Daniel Deudney’s (2007) 
global federalism, the complex and dynamic aspects of state agency Arendt’s federalism 
maintains do not figure much. Relying on the change in material contexts produced by the 
development of weapons of mass destruction and affirming the efficacy of the early American 
model of federal power restraints, the security-oriented federalism, a la Deudney, envisions a 
Philadelphian moment on a global scale to establish a world constitution on which all states 
are federated (Blachford, 2019: 35-39).  
This security variant of federalism that focuses on material capabilities may dispel the 
Arendtian ambiguity and entertain a more promising global federation. However, it faces the 
question of whether international cooperation driven by a fear of mutual destruction can be 
considered authentically political. For Arendt, true politics happens when people act together 
for freedom and find joy in the public activity itself. A flashy moment of unity formed by an 
enormous fear of destruction is qualitatively different from what Arendt (1998: 57) calls 
“sameness in utter diversity,” the condition that diverse equals fulfill through a strenuous 
process of public debate and deliberation. Federal arrangements envisioned by this view of 
the political are highly contingent because their fundamental base is the public worlds “born 
of the specific actions and agreements of particular men and dependent on continuing support 
for their survival” (Canovan, 1992: 248). Beyond the philosophical/theoretical level, Arendt’s 
political thought greatly appreciates the contingent aspect of public worlds. It thus differs from 
approaches that offer a blueprint for solving the contemporary problems of politics (even in 
the form of federalism).  
Arendt’s reflections on federalism make some specific issues less clear, leaving the task 
of clarification to actual citizens who deliberate about the future of their common spaces for 
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freedom and revealing the complexity of those problems. Arendt intends to do so because for 
her, the task of balancing the two demands of international politics through federalism is not 
to reconcile them but to generate questions to reflect upon through her vision of free politics. 
Arendt offers us a distinctive model of free politics that views the two demands of equality as 
neither contradictory nor reconciliatory but rather as ideal types along a continuum—allowing 
us to explore a middle ground for international discourse with a clear acknowledgement of its 
precariousness.5 In the divisive context of contemporary politics, this approach draws timely 
attention to the importance of balancing the claims of intra-state and inter-state equality 
beyond rhetorical exaggeration while helping us see the fundamental complexity relating to 
state agency we inevitably encounter when pursuing international federalism.   
Arendt’s council-based federalism can best be characterized as a modest exploration 
of a middle way of politics that acknowledges the contingency of politics and the limits of 
theorizing about politics. This approach differs not only from a realism that takes for granted 
the presence of self-contained political communities in international politics and from a 
cosmopolitanism that underrates the danger of world tyranny but also from some of the 
alternative approaches to international relations that confuse theoretical possibilities with 
practical politics. To meet the two competing demands of equality, Arendt never ceases to 
emphasize the role of actual political actors, urging them to consider what they gain and lose 
from attending to each side of free politics. Indeed, her federalism offers important principles, 
if not an ultimate solution, that political actors in either domestic or international scenes 
should consider when judging the future of their common spaces for freedom. As such, it 
 
5 On Arendt’s complex usage of the Weberian term, “ideal type,” see Arendt (1973: 361-362[n57], 
1979: 329); Baehr (2010: 26); Klusmeyer (2009: 35).  
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facilitates politicizing federation by showing both its merit as a mode of balancing essential 
demands for free politics and its fundamental complexity. This much-needed sensitivity to 
international discourse is what Arendt’s federalism promises us.   
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